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Introduction 
  
 Since the 1960s, Cuban Americans have made social, economic, and political 
progress far beyond that of most immigrant groups that have come to the United States in 
the past fifty years.  I will argue that the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) 
was very influential in helping the Cuban Americans achieve much of this progress.  It is, 
however, important to note that Cubans had some distinct advantages from the beginning, 
in terms of wealth and education.  These advantages helped this ethnic interest group to 
grow quickly and become powerful.  Since its inception in the early 1980s, the CANF has 
continually been able to shape government policy on almost all issues related to Cuba.  
Until at least the end of the Cold War, the CANF and the Cuban American population 
presented a united front in that their main goal was to present a hard line towards Castro 
and defeat him; they sought any government assistance they could get to achieve this 
goal, from policy changes to funding for different dissident activities.  In more recent 
years, Cubans have begun to differ in their opinions of the best policy towards Cuba.  I 
will argue that this change along with other changes will decrease the effectiveness of the 
CANF.  CANF lobbying has often resulted in policies that give Cubans an unfair 
advantage. Sometimes is has even resulted in policies that may not necessarily be in line 
with national interest for the U.S.  The U.S. government has several reasons to maintain 
its support for this ethnic organization.  Traditionally, the U.S. has supported Cuban 
exiles because they considered them to be persecuted under a communist regime.  Now, 
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with the U.S. emphasis on spreading democracy, the CANF is seen as an organization 
that can possibly bring about democracy in Cuba.  Additionally, Cuban Americans have 
donated significant amounts to various political campaigns and are an important voting 
bloc in heavily populated South Florida.  Although it is impossible to pinpoint the exact 
causes of the rise and possible decline of the CANF and Cuban influence, I have found 
several factors that seem to contribute.  Ideologies of anti-communism and democracy 
building, a united goal of defeating Castro, the money and organization to create a 
powerful voting bloc and lobbying group, and presidential favor all contributed to the rise 
of the CANF; growing anti-immigration sentiment and a less cohesive member base pose 
a threat to the ongoing success of this group.   
 I will begin with a discussion of how the CANF was formed.  I will address the 
situations that led Cubans to be considered as a favored group and the anticommunist 
sentiments of the early 1980s.  I will then turn to the CANF’s role in local politics verses 
its role in national politics.  I will explore the CANF’s emphasis on national politics as 
connected to their goals which are largely related to foreign policy.  Next, I will talk 
about the way in which Cubans have been treated as compared to other immigrant 
groups.  I present the Cuban case as exceptional especially in comparison to the Haitians.  
I then turn to the funding of the CANF, which comes largely from the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED).  I will discuss how this funding allows the U.S. 
government to be involved in dissident work that it would not like others to know it is 
involved in.  One such project I will discuss in this paper is Radio Marti, a government 
financed radio station that operates in Cuba.  Next I explain the Cuban involvement in a 
 3 
variety of legislation during the Clinton years, including the Toricelli Bill and the Helms-
Burton Act.  These bills are prime examples of the influence that the CANF can exert in 
the lobbying arena.  Both bills were passed after the Cold War, yet the CANF maintained 
its influence.  Although the rhetoric of communism had passed, the CANF was able to 
play into electoral politics and the rhetoric of democracy building.  I then discuss the 
Cuban influence in electoral politics in Florida.  Although the Cuban voting bloc was 
never large enough to determine the winner of the presidential election, they still 
represent a sizable constituency.  Since presidential favor is important to the CANF, it is 
especially important to this group to show their support for various presidential 
candidates.  Finally I turn to a discussion of the present state of the Cuban American 
population.  I address growing anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. and the prospects for 
Cuban Americans after President George W. Bush leaves office.  I also mention the 
changes in the attitudes of younger Cubans towards U.S. foreign policy. 
In writing my thesis I gathered my data from a variety of sources.  Most of my 
information came from secondary sources on a range of topics from interest group 
formation, to immigrant assimilation, to information on the Cubans in Miami, etc..  I also 
made use of many newspaper articles, especially for my information on electoral results.  
Some of the information, such as that on the NED came from the websites of groups 
trying to promote transparency in the United States.  Finally, I made use of several 
statistical studies on electoral results.  My research focused on topics from the 1950s to 
the present. 
 4 
Chapter I 
The Cuban American National Foundation: How was it Formed? 
 
  
To understand the foundations of the Cuban American National Foundation 
(CANF) it is important to understand the conditions under which it was formed.  Few 
would argue that the Cold War did not have major implications for U.S. policy in Latin 
America and everywhere in the world, for that matter.  From the beginning of the 1950s 
the U.S. seemed to base its policy objectives on its goal of defeating communism.  Much 
of the rhetoric of this time period described communism as the primary enemy of the 
U.S.  A closer look at the Cold War era shows that promoting regimes friendly to 
capitalist interests was another primary goal.  In Latin America, this meant using almost 
any means necessary to make sure that communist leaders did not come to power, or in 
the case of Cuba, using any means to defeat them once they rose to power.  “The success 
of Castro’s revolution in 1959 had a profound impact on U.S. immigration policy” (“The 
Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966”, 908).  After Castro’s revolution, careful policy making 
concerning Cuba had become crucial.  However the first policy decision with regards to 
Castro ended up working against the United States.  Eisenhower’s refusal to meet with 
Castro led Castro to form an alliance with the communist Soviet Union; before forming 
this alliance Castro was not a communist and posed little threat to the U.S. (Leogrande, 
“Cuba Policy Recycled,” 106).   
U.S. leaders reacted to Castro’s alliance with the Soviets by taking a hard line 
against the Cuban government and trying to undermine Castro economically and 
politically.  In 1962 the U.S. imposed an embargo on Cuba, devastating the Cuban 
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economy.  Then, in 1966, Congress passed the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) in order to 
further some of its policy goals and undermine Castro’s government.  The CAA changed 
immigration policy towards Cuban immigrants, making them a special favored group.  
Under this act, Cubans who arrive in the U.S. are automatically paroled, without having 
to apply for asylum, as other immigrants do.  After spending two years in the U.S., these 
immigrants are then granted permanent resident status.  “The CAA helped advance three 
Cold War objectives.  First, by facilitating a mass exodus from Cuba…Second, the CAA 
aided in undermining the legitimacy of the Cuban government…Lastly, the CAA helped 
the American government achieve broader political goals”(“The Cuban Adjustment Act 
of 1966”, 909).  After the Eisenhower administration’s “missed opportunity” basically 
handed Cuba to the USSR, the U.S. needed to prove Castro unsuccessful in order to 
prove the strength of democracy.  By achieving these objectives, the U.S. felt that they 
were saving Cubans from the conditions in which they were forced to live, while 
undermining the Cuban government by proving that people would leave Cuba if given 
the chance.  The CAA resulted in massive groups of Cuban immigrants flocking to the 
U.S. in the late 60s and 70s; overwhelmingly they settled in Miami.  “The migration flow 
from the island, because it originated with the process of socialist transformation, has 
been disproportionately composed of individuals who possess a complex of skills, 
aspirations, and experiences that give them a relative advantage of most other U.S. 
immigrant groups in the process of economic adjustment” (Perez, 134).  These displaced 
people were often businessmen and individuals who had held prominent positions in 
Cuba before Castro came to power.  With Castro’s new government they were not 
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welcome to voice their opinions or were driven out of the county.  In sum, the U.S. 
government took a hard line against the Cuban government while welcoming in Cuban 
refugees. 
The situation changed slightly in the late 70s during Carter’s presidency.  “A 
series of agreements with Cuba in the first year of the Carter presidency seemed to mark 
the beginning of a new era of U.S.-Cuban relations.  Fishing and maritime agreements 
were signed, travel restrictions that had been in place were not renewed, and the two 
governments reestablished diplomatic relations” (Haney and Vanderbush, 346).  Tensions 
with Cuba, and in the Cold War in general, seemed to be easing.   
However, when Reagan came to office all this changed.  One situation that had a 
profound effect on Reagan’s policy towards Cuba was the Mariel boatlift. “By 1980, 
however, the pressures for emigration once again caused the Cuban government to open a 
port for unrestricted emigration.  The port was Mariel, giving the name to the boatlift that 
lasted for six months and that brought, in a manner uncontrolled by the United States, 
more than 125,000 Cubans” (Perez, 130).  This new influx of Cubans put increased 
pressure on Reagan to somehow toughen relations with Cuba.  If he just sat back and let 
Castro get away with this, he would appear to be letting Castro have the upper hand.  He 
effectively reversed any progress that Carter had made in the direction of creating a 
friendlier relationship with Cuba.  It was during Reagan’s presidency that the CANF was 
first conceived of. 
In the mean time, between the time the Cuban Adjustment Act was passed in 
1966 and Reagan’s presidency in the early 80s, the Cuban exile community in Miami 
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managed to make extremely successful inroads in both the economic and political arenas.  
“By 1980, a successful entrepreneurial class with accumulated surplus capital had 
emerged within the Cuban American community…This new prosperity could be tapped 
to create a presence in Washington…This convergence of economic and political 
conditions made possible the creation of the Cuban American National Foundation” 
(Grenier and Perez, 91).  As Cuban Americans became prosperous, the Reagan 
government found itself in need of an organization to promote its goals for Cuba and 
Latin America.  These two groups’ ambitions coincided in that both groups were 
determined to undermine Castro and willing to work with each other.  Cuban Americans 
welcomed any support they could get from the U.S. government and were eager to have 
their voices heard in Congress.  Reagan needed a voice besides his own to convince the 
American public of the need to crack down on Cuba.  Haney and Vanderbush notice that 
both groups found it crucial to influence public opinion in the U.S. during this time 
period.  According to these researchers, for the Reagan administration, “An alliance with 
exiles from the island, who were themselves intent on maintaining pressure on Castro, 
certainly made sense.  Both the Reagan administration and a Cuban-American lobby had 
much to gain from each other” (Haney and Vanderbush, 347).  Hence the CANF was 
formed. 
Although some people claim that the Cuban American National Foundation was 
formed independently of the Reagan administration, there is significant evidence that 
Reagan’s administration had at least an influence in the formation of this group.  On the 
one hand, “Jorge Mas Canosa [one of the founder’s of CANF] has claimed that the 
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impetus for CANF was the idea of a few Cuban-Americans, acting on their own, without 
help from any Reagan supporters” (Haney and Vanderbush, 347).   Mas names Pepe 
Hernandez, Raul Masvidal, and Carlos Salmon as three of the original members.  On the 
other hand, “Masvidal, who has since left CANF following a series of disputes with Mas, 
recalls a different version of the organization’s founding.  He claims that the original 
push for the CANF’s formation came from Richard Allen, Reagan’s first National 
Security Advisor” (Haney and Vanderbush, 348).  According to Haney and Vanderbush 
several media outlets and major newspapers corroborate Masvidal’s story.  “The New 
York Times and Washington Post use some variation of ‘at the behest of the Reagan 
administration [in their description of the founding of this organization]” (Haney and 
Vanderbush, 348).  Haney and Vanderbush also note that Allen has admitted to advising 
Mas to create a group along the lines of the Israeli lobbying group. 
Whether or not the Reagan administration in fact had a direct effect on the 
formation of the CANF, Reagan’s policies and objectives created the political space 
necessary for the CANF to form.  Whereas Carter had emphasized easing tensions, 
Reagan’s hard line policies allowed the political space for a group intent on undermining 
Castro to speak.  And, coincidentally or not, the CANF did end up forming along the 
lines of the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), as Allen had suggested.  
“CANF is structured like AIPAC – into separate research, lobbying, and funding 
organizations.  Money is contributed through the Free Cuba political action committee, 
lobbying is done by the Cuban American Foundation and the CANF itself served a 
research and education function” (Haney and Vanderbush, 349).  Haney and Vanderbush 
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note that separating the organization into these three branches allowed the CANF to 
receive government funding while remaining a tax-exempt organization.  Another aspect 
of the AIPAC model the CANF used was developing local branches throughout the 
country.  By this time, Cubans had formed significant communities in some other parts of 
the country besides South Florida, especially in New Jersey.  Forming local branches 
allowed them to gain more widespread support and reach more members of Congress.   
On the CANF’s official website they state their goals to: “advance human rights 
in Cuba,” “educate public opinion on the plights of Cuban people,” “dispel prejudice and 
intolerance against Cubans in exile,” and “promote Cuban culture” (www.CANF.org).  
Although the language it uses has changed with the language and circumstances of the 
times, the CANF continues to lobby and educate for essentially the same purposes it did 
before.  In an attempt to overthrow Castro the CANF now uses a language of “advancing 
human rights” and “assisting pro-democracy activists” rather than a language of defeating 
communism.  They continue to “educate public opinion” as they did during the Reagan 
years in the 1980s.  Finally, they maintain their culture and dispel prejudices partially in 
the hopes that one day they can return to Cuba. 
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Chapter II 
The Role of the Cubans and the CANF in Miami’s Local Politics and Implications for 
National Politics 
 
 From the early 1980s to the present, Cubans have made up a sizable proportion of 
Miami’s population.  Although Cubans have moved throughout the country and have 
large populations elsewhere, Miami remains home to the largest Cuban population in the 
U.S. by far.  “The Miami-Ft. Lauderdale region of southeast Florida accounts for slightly 
more than 52 percent of the entire Cuban-origin population of the United States” (Perez, 
130).  Not surprisingly, Miami is also the birthplace of the Cuban American National 
Foundation (CANF).  Considering the substantial influence the CANF has in national 
politics, which I will discuss later in this paper, one might think that the CANF would 
have an equally significant effect on Miami’s local politics.  Unexpectedly, however, 
although many of the same men who lead the CANF are prominent businessmen in 
Miami, this organization has less influence on local politics than one would think.  The 
main Florida politics the CANF gets involved in are those that have an effect on politics 
at the national level.  Cuban politicians in Miami appear preoccupied with foreign policy; 
they manifest this preoccupation by raising large amounts of money for the national 
group. Miami politics at the local level reflect the niche the CANF is trying to occupy at 
the national level.  Much of policy at the local and state level has the secondary goal of 
trying to influence the executive branch of the U.S. government and in turn effect foreign 
policy. 
 The situation of Cubans in Miami is a unique one, which plays an integral role in 
the shaping of local politics. Perez writes, “In comparison with other major U.S. Hispanic 
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groups, the sociodemographic profile of the Cubans is fairly unique; a large proportion of 
middle-aged and elderly persons, a female majority, low fertility, and high 
socioeconomic status” (Perez, 126).   Perez explains this unique demographic through 
three factors: “the socioeconomic selectivity of postrevolutionary Cuban emigration,” 
“high rates of female labor force participation,” and “the presence of a strong ethnic 
enclave” (Perez, 126).  As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Castro’s rise to power 
resulted in an overwhelming emigration of wealthy businessmen and intellectuals; this is 
the socioeconomic selectivity that Perez notes.  The once Cuban elite were seen as a 
threat to Castro’s consolidation of power.  “It is undoubtedly true that during the 1960s 
Cuba’s upper socioeconomic sectors, those most likely to be alienated by Cuba’s swift 
transformation into a socialist state, were overrepresented in the exodus” (Perez, 129).  
Even in the U.S., these men continue to be a threat to Castro’s power through 
organizations such as the CANF.  For example, Jorge Mas Canosa migrated to the U.S. in 
the 1960s; by the 1980s he owned a telecommunications company worth $700 million 
and was able to use some of his profits towards founding the CANF (PBS.org).  The large 
proportion of middle-aged and elderly, low fertility rate, and high female labor force 
participation also contribute to the wealth and power that prominent Cubans in Miami 
have been able to amass.  In contrast to many Hispanic immigrant groups, Cubans in 
general have already gained job skills and established themselves; the majority are not 
starting out with young families and insignificant work backgrounds.  These factors have 
allowed Cubans in Miami to create an ethnic enclave, and in return the ethnic enclave 
works to assist new immigrants in adapting to Cuban life in the U.S.  “Recent Cuban 
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immigrants enter the U.S. market, primarily through the large number of enterprises in 
South Florida that are owned and operated by other Cubans who arrived earlier” (Perez, 
135).  All these characteristics of the Cuban population in Miami make for a favorable 
situation for Cubans to gain local political power. 
 Although Cubans have gained a significant share of power in Miami, they are not 
the only ones vying for power in the complicated structure of Miami politics.  Grenier 
and Castro argue that there exists, “a triadic structure—black, Cuban, and Anglo—that 
underlies and often confounds contemporary politics in Miami” (Grenier and Castro, 
274).  This structure is further complicated by the racism that exists between these groups 
and the Cuban politicians’ focus on foreign policy and national politics.  “Early Cuban 
refugees were drawn largely from the white, urban middle class…Most shared a belief in 
the superiority of capitalism, a confidence in their own abilities, and a positive regard for 
the United States” (Grenier and Castro, 279).  In the 1960s, at a time when black civil 
rights leaders nationwide were clashing with prominent whites, Cubans immigrants, who 
were a mainly white and represented a rejection of communism, were welcomed into 
politics with open arms.  As black leaders were continually pushed down, many Cubans 
were able to get ahead.  There was no shortage of ethnically based programs to help them 
out.  The federal government provided an assistance program for new Cuban immigrants 
and “vast CIA operations run out of Miami in the early 1960s meant an infusion of cash 
into the local Cuban community” (Grenier and Castro, 280).  Racism in all aspects of life 
in Miami was not limited to the 1960s.  “Between 1968 and 1980 the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) cumulatively disbursed 46.6 percent of its Miami-Dade County 
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loans to Hispanics.  Only 6 percent went to blacks” (279).  All this worked to create and 
cement a political structure in Miami that is fraught with racism and difficulties in which 
Cubans, Blacks, and Anglos are constantly vying for power. 
 Since 1980, Cubans have been able to make further significant inroads into the 
Anglo-dominated political scene in Miami.  “Cubans now are well on their way to 
establishing significant political power in Miami, a process that both benefits from their 
economic wherewithal and in turn serves to increase it” (Grenier and Castro, 282).  
Grenier and Castro then go on to explain, “Cuban American power is exercised through a 
growing number of elected officials and influential organizations, such as the Cuban 
American National Foundation” (Grenier and Castro, 282)  It is evident that the CANF 
influences local officials, yet it is the way that they often use this influence which makes 
the situation particularly interesting.  As of 1999 some of this influence was felt as “the 
city manager in Miami and the executive mayor of Miami-Dade County are Cuban 
Americans…More than a third of the county’s current delegation to the state legislature is 
Cuban American.  Two Cuban-born Republicans serve as members of Congress” 
(Grenier and Castro, 282).  In her analysis of Miami’s vast growth in the past few 
decades Jan Nijman notes the effective results of the “incessant lobbying, manipulating 
and cajoling” of the CANF in Miami.  She argues that this lobbying has served mainly to 
fuel Miami’s expansive economic growth in recent years.  Nijman writes that it is typical 
of immigrants in a new community to have a focus on bettering themselves economically.  
Because of this, she argues that many of the Cuban leaders of Miami are very 
concentrated on economic gains and lose focus of civic concerns.  She describes Miami 
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as a place that is ruled by the global economy and is lacking in civic institutions.  A result 
of this according to Nijman is, “Despite their growing importance on the political scene, 
Miami’s Hispanics are still underrepresented in local government.  Of 27 municipalities 
in Dade County, only 5 have a majority of Hispanics in their elected offices” (Nijman, 
170).  Although Cubans remain underrepresented at the local level, they are overly 
represented at the state and federal level where, considering Florida’s electoral votes, 
they can make a difference in national politics.  “Of all the Dade County representatives 
at the federal and state level, and overwhelming majority are Hispanic (14 of 25), all of 
them Cuban.  This is a reflection of the concerns of Cuban Americans with issues 
regarding Cuba and Cuban refugees, which are mainly decided at the state and federal 
level” (Nijman, 170).  Rather than becoming involved in local politics in order to 
influence their local communities, Nijman argues, Cubans in Miami remain primarily 
concerned with raising money at the local level.  This money can be then fed through 
organizations such as the CANF that work to promote concerns at the state and federal 
level.  The CANF remains minimally involved at the local level unless the situation 
pertains to a question that could be solved at the federal level, such as a question of 
foreign policy.  
 Both the racial tension involved in local Miami politics and the Cubans’ focus on 
foreign policy issues are evident in local newspapers.  Guillermo Grenier and Max Castro 
conducted a study of articles in newspapers with a predominantly black readership and 
newspapers with a predominantly Cuban readership.  They found, “Black perceptions of 
Cubans are characterized currently by increasing concern over their growing power and 
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an adversarial discourse stressing conflict and competition over cooperation” (Grenier 
and Castro, 283).  Clearly this level of conflict felt by Blacks reflects the racially tinted 
political scene and in turn fuels further conflict.  “Cuban perceptions of blacks, while 
adversarial, do not feature as prominently in Cuban American discourse, which is 
centered more on issues of Cuba, Cuban American advancement, and relations with the 
still economically elite Anglos” (Grenier and Castro, 283).  Overall Cubans seem less 
focused on what is going on in their community and more focused on issues related to 
Cuba.  Grenier and Castro also describe instances of local crime which receive little focus 
in Cuban newspapers and more in black newspapers.  Cubans’ attention remains on 
issues beyond their local community, reinforcing Nijman’s assertion that locally Cubans 
are focused on their foreign policy goals. 
 Many of the issues surrounding local Miami politics can be illustrated by studying 
the reactions of the various ethnic groups to Nelson Mandela’s visit in 1990.  “Cubans 
…were outraged at his [Mandela’s] refusal to disavow Fidel Castro” (Grenier and Castro, 
273).  As a result, local Cuban politicians refused to meet with Mandela or acknowledge 
his visit.  In this situation, local Cuban politicians were showing their concern with 
foreign policy issues.  Shortly thereafter, various leaders of black organizations organized 
a boycott of Miami that led to significant economic losses.  Cuban leaders did not even 
attend the talks that ended this boycott.  This is just one example of the fragmented 
political scene that exists in Miami today. 
 The whole local political situation fits in well with the role the CANF plays 
furthering the executive branch of government’s goals. The executive branch has little 
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need for local politics.  Additionally, the CANF has little need for local politicians who 
have no real sway with those making foreign policy decisions.  The CANF better spends 
its time locally raising money for its lobbying activities for foreign policy issues. 
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Chapter III 
Cubans as a Favored Immigrant Group: The Cuban Adjustment Act and the Case of the 
Haitian Boat People 
 
  
As mentioned in previous chapters, the Cuban American National Foundation 
(CANF) was formed in a climate of general good favor towards Cuban American 
immigrants.  The Cuban Adjustment Act, which offered Cuban immigrants automatic 
asylum based on assumed political persecution, was passed in 1966.  Between 1966 and 
the formation of the CANF in the 1980s, many Cubans migrated and gained permanent 
residency with little opposition.  This favorable treatment only intensified as the Reagan 
administration encouraged the formation of a Cuban exile group in the form of the 
CANF; this served as part of President Reagan’s greater mission to allegedly fight the 
threat of the spread of communism under Castro.  The favoritism shown towards the 
Cubans is especially emphasized in contrast to the treatment received by Haitian 
migrants.  Increasingly in the 1970s and 1980s Haitians were turned away from American 
shores, often without even being given a chance to have their cases heard.  These 
contrasting attitudes towards Cuba, a communist nation, and Haiti, a repressive country 
supported by the U.S., set the stage for the later successes of the CANF. 
A close examination of the history of the difference between the situation in Haiti 
and the situation in Cuba reveals that the U.S. treats these immigrants very differently 
despite fairly similar experiences among the two groups.  This advantaged treatment 
helped the CANF to form and exert its influence.  Before Castro’s rise to power, the U.S. 
was intimately involved in influencing Cuba’s leaders and virtually controlled Cuba’s 
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economy.  When Castro gained power, this quickly came to an end.    During the Cold 
War this did not bode well for U.S. interests; the U.S. wanted control over the whole 
region.  Historically, Haiti was in a similar situation with regards to the U.S.  “As one 
historian comments, ‘the success or failure of a Haitian government is always ultimately 
determined by relations with the US’” (Lennox, 692).  A history of U.S. occupation led 
the Haitian government to be tied to the U.S.  Their economy and political decisions 
became linked with the wishes of U.S. leaders.  From 1915 to 1934 the U.S. occupied 
Haiti, and for almost 15 years after this, the U.S. retained power over the Haitian 
treasury.  During this time the U.S. trained Haitian military leaders and paved the way for 
a politically and economically weakened Haiti.  In 1957 Francois Duvalier came to 
power, succeeded by his son Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1971.  Duvalier instituted a regime 
of violence and vast human rights violations.  When he created a paramilitary force, 
“political opposition to Duvalier was dealt with through these personal instruments of 
state terror” (Loescher and Scanlan, 317).  Following Duvalier’s accession to power, vast 
numbers of Haitians began to migrate to the U.S.  Like in Cuba, the first immigrants were 
mostly wealthy well-educated people, followed by successive waves that were more 
representative of the population.  Similar to the situation in Cuba, these immigrants were 
fleeing from widespread political persecution by a regime that was able to come to power 
partially because of political instability in the country that had been fostered by the U.S.   
By the 1960s Cuban exiles were getting various types of support from the U.S. 
government, while Haitian exiles were getting exactly the opposite.  In 1966 when the 
government passed the Cuban Adjustment Act, the government also passed a variety of 
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measures to hinder the efforts of Haitian groups trying to overthrow Duvalier.  “Radio 
jamming equipment was provided to Haiti to counter broadcasts of anti-Duvalier exiles, 
and a vigorous law enforcement effort was initiated to stop exile activities – organization, 
training, fundraising, or launching attacks – based in the U.S. and aimed at Haiti” 
(Loescher, 326).  This is especially interesting in comparison to the aid given to Cuban 
exile groups.  The U.S. government directly helped Cuban exiles broadcast messages via 
Radio Marti.  Additionally, U.S. officials “arrested groups of Haitian exiles training in 
Florida, seized large arms caches, and indicted their leaders for planning to invade Haiti 
and to export arms illegally” (Loescher, 326).  Again, this showed a sharp contrast to 
treatment of Cuban exiles. 
Although many U.S. officials have claimed that the Haitian boat people are 
fundamentally different from the Cubans in that they are economic rather than political 
exiles, the historical similarities show that this is not true.  Both groups were fleeing from 
oppressive political regimes; the Haitians from Duvalier, and the Cubans from Castro.  At 
first the wealthy Haitian migrants were afforded basically the same treatment as the 
wealthy Cuban migrants who were immigrating.  “If Haitians claimed political refugee 
status, the INS ordinarily placed them under ‘docket control,’ in effect failing to enforce 
orders of deportation while granting work authorization, yet denying all opportunity to 
obtain permanent residence status.  This treatment was similar to that initially afforded 
hundreds of Cubans who arrived in the United States without visas” (Loescher,  319).  
However, around 1965, U.S. policy changed to a policy based on Cold War politics and 
arguably racism rather than equal treatment of political refugees.  Rules for Cubans were 
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relaxed, while Haitains were henceforth considered economic refugees.  “Subsequent 
steps to relax immigration rules for the Cubans, including the practice of waiving the visa 
requirement altogether, and the passage of Public Law 763 in 1966 to grant earlier 
arrivals ‘permanent resident’ status’ were not taken for the Haitians” (Loescher, 319).  
After the passage of this law, also known as the Cuban Adjustment Act, Cubans were 
automatically considered political refugees and granted permanent residency status after 
being in the country for only two years.  Haitians, on the other hand, who were no longer 
coming from the upper echelons of society, were now considered to be migrating for 
economic motives.  Since, most of Haiti was deeply entrenched in poverty, it was 
therefore easy to make this argument. 
 After 1966 Haitian migrants in most circumstances were denied entrance to the 
country.  “The two traditional explanations for U.S. immigration policy are: (1) Haitians 
are economic, not political, refugees; and (2) Haiti is a noncommunist country” (Lennox, 
704).  Haiti was therefore removed from a list of countries whose immigrants are 
considered political exiles, and Haitian immigrants were subject to being captured at sea 
or detained in camps in the U.S. and elsewhere.  “In 1981, President Reagan issued a 
proclamation authorizing the Coast Guard to interdict vessels carrying Haitians at sea, 
before they reached U.S. soil” (Lennox, 703).  The vast majority of these people were not 
even afforded a trial to claim their status as political refugees, and of those who were, 
only a few succeeded.  “Between 1981 and 1990, 22,940 Haitians were intercepted at sea; 
only eleven were deemed qualified to apply for asylum” (Lennox, 704).  In 1992 when a 
surge of refugees reached Guantanamo, President Bush declared that all ships would be 
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sent back to Haiti without even a chance to prove political refugee status (Mitchell, 79).  
Although this move angered many and was denounced as racist in comparison with 
Cubans and Eastern European immigrants, Clinton continued the policy into his 
presidency.  Cleary treatment of Haitians was nothing like the presidential favoritism 
shown to Cuban exiles.  Reagan went out of his way to foster the formation of the CANF, 
while he introduced policies such as the interdiction policy for Haitian immigrants.  
Having the support of the Cuban exiles helped him in his anti-Castro policies towards the 
region, while he cared little for the fate of Haitians undergoing human rights violations in 
Haiti.  Reagan’s favoritism strengthened the position of Cubans exiles and certainly 
paved the way for the vast influence the CANF would have into the 1990s and even 
today. 
  In conclusion, the comparison between Cuban and Haitian exiles 
emphasizes the favoritism shown towards Cuban immigrants over other groups.  Special 
measures such as the Cuban Adjustment Act were passed to help Cuban immigrants 
while other groups such as the Haitians were being rejected.  Critics verbalize a number 
of reasons for this, including the U.S. rhetorical commitment to defeating communism 
and racial prejudices that existed at the time.  Whatever the reason, the favored treatment 
of Cuban exiles led the way for the formation of the powerful CANF.  While Haitian 
broadcasting programs were being blocked, Cuban programs were being actively 
supported.  Reagan was able to use the Cuban exiles to his advantage in a way that 
presidents were not able to use other exile groups like the Haitians.  The special treatment 
of the CAA only worked to foster more special treatment in the future. 
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Chapter IV 
CANF Coordination with the National Endowment for Democracy 
 
 The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is an important source of 
funding for the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and other anti-Castro 
groups, both in the U.S. and in Cuba.  This group was originally created in 1983 to 
promote democracy abroad through enhancing civil society.  During the late 1970s and 
early 1980s there was a backlash among the American public regarding the secretive 
methods of the CIA in its efforts at democracy building.  The National Endowment for 
Democracy was conceived of as a response to these criticisms.  Technically the NED 
would be separate from the U.S. government; although it is funded by the government, 
the NED is a private organization.  The activities of the NED would be out in the open 
and would not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. government.  One of the NED’s 
main strategies for defeating communism was funding groups that would work to subvert 
communist governments such as Castro’s, so from the beginning the NED gave a large 
portion of its funds to groups like the CANF.  The NED is one group that contributed 
greatly to the growth of the CANF for its democracy building capabilities, while 
providing yet another link between the group and the U.S. government. 
 The National Endowment for Democracy was created by the Reagan 
administration in the early 1980s to represent key U.S. labor and business interests as 
well as the interests of the two major political parties in the U.S.  Thomas Carothers 
writes that “taking into account the need for a politically balanced structure to maximize 
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chances of congressional approval, the group elaborated a plan for a democracy 
foundation that would be funded by the U.S. government but operated as a private 
corporation.  It would have four core grantee institutes representing U.S. labor, U.S. 
business, the Republican party, and the Democratic party” (Carothers, 125).  These four 
institutes are, respectively, the Free Trade Union Institute, the Center for International 
Private Enterprise, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs.  These groups can then delegate the money they receive 
to smaller groups that work on the ground, such as the CANF.  In general the money is 
divided up by geographical region.  For instance a certain amount will go to Latin 
America, a certain amount to Africa, some to Asia, etc.  “The endowment is funded 
through a line item in the annual budget of USIA…Annual congressional funding for the 
endowment ranged from $15 million to $18 million [yearly] from 1984 to 1990 and from 
$25 million to $30 [yearly] million from 1991 to 1993” (Carothers, 126).  Both the 
Clinton and the Bush administrations have continued to increase funding for this 
organization.  In addition to distributing money to the four institutes, the NED also 
reserves about twenty percent of its funds for special projects that they consider 
extremely important.   
Since Cuba is a close neighbor to the U.S. and one of the only remaining 
communist countries after the cold war, groups aimed at subverting the Cuban 
government are often recipients of these discretionary funds. “The Cuban American 
National Foundation was, predictably, one of the first beneficiaries of NED funding.  
From 1983 to 1988, CANF received US$390,000 for anti-Castro activities” (Agee, 2).  
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This might seem predictable given the Reagan administration and Republican party’s 
favoritism for the group in the 1980s; however, the CANF continued receiving a large 
amount of funding well into the 21st century.  According to a study by Right Web, in 
2002 the International Republican Institute’s largest grant of $350,000 went to programs 
related to Cuba.  This article also states, “two of the favored instruments of NED 
democratization funding in Cuba were the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) 
and the AFL-CIO’s American Institute for Free Labor Development” (Right Web, 5).  
The CANF and other groups can then use this money for a variety of activities from 
organization in Miami to dissident activity on the island.  In being a private corporation, 
the NED has the ability to achieve things that the U.S. government could not, through its 
funding of smaller organizations like the CANF.  If the U.S. government were to directly 
aid anti-Castro groups within Cuba, this would be considered a violation of territorial 
sovereignty.  “Cuba has its own laws criminalizing actions intended to jeopardize its 
sovereignty or territorial integrity…such as collecting information to support the US 
embargo or to the subvert the government, or for disseminating US government 
information to undermine the Cuban government” (Agee, 3).  The U.S., particularly the 
CIA, has certainly been involved in a variety of operations that do aid subversive groups; 
however, it looks better for the government to not have a direct involvement in these 
activities and to let private groups do the majority of the dirty work.  Thus, the CANF is 
able to do things that the government would never be able to do directly.  In this way, the 
CANF is yet again connected to the U.S. government.  The organization’s growth and 
 25 
funding is directly tied to continual government support.  They must take part in lobbying 
and other activities to make sure that they maintain this support. 
The NED finances the CANF purportedly with the goal of bringing about a 
democratic government in Cuba; however, results towards this goal have been less than 
satisfactory both because of the methods of the NED and of the CANF.  For one, the 
traditional CANF strategy of supporting the embargo and cutting off all communication 
has not seemed to have much effect towards bringing about a democratic government in 
Cuba.  One of the key goals of the promotion of democracy abroad is to bring an end to 
human rights abuses that are often rampart under dictatorships.  Agee argues that in the 
case of Cuba, however, the U.S. is actually promoting human rights abuses.  He cites the 
case of Castro’s imprisonment of 75 political dissidents.  He writes that there was an 
outcry against this imprisonment in the U.S., but these political dissidents were actually 
funded by the U.S. under NED programs.  Cases like this are prevalent in a country 
where the U.S. effectively encourages people to break local laws.  Additionally, the NED 
has been heavily criticized for funding right wing groups while neglecting to fund leftist 
groups that are just as legitimate despite its stated goal to promote pluralism of opinion.  
“The NED hasn’t provided aid to foster progressive or leftist opposition in Mexico, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, or Eastern Europe…Cuban dissident groups and media 
are heavily supported however” (Blum, 4).  It is evident that the NED, one of the largest 
sources of funding for the CANF is far from perfect. 
In conclusion, NED funding serves to connect the CANF to the U.S. government.  
The CANF must work to court the support of the government in order to maintain 
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funding.  At the same time, since the NED is technically a private organization, the 
government must work to court the support of the CANF and other organizations that 
receive funding but are essentially free to work on their own.  Through NED funding, the 
CANF is able to accomplish on the ground activities in Cuba that the U.S. government 
would never be able to publicly undertake.  The NED adds yet another element to the 
complicated intertwined relationship between the CANF and the U.S. government. 
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Chapter V 
The Case of Radio Marti 
 
  
Radio Marti is one of the longest ongoing projects between the U.S. government 
and the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF).  This project was conceived of in 
the early 1980s, around the same time that the CANF was created.  Jorge Mas Canosa, 
one of the founders and longtime leaders of the CANF also served on the Executive 
Commission for the Formation of Radio Marti.  In creating Radio Marti, President 
Reagan sought to provide news and information to the people of Cuba, who he claimed 
were misinformed by their own government.  This project was similar to other projects in 
Eastern Europe, where the U.S. government used radio broadcasts to provide communist 
countries with information.  The difference, of course, is while these countries were 
thousands of miles away, Cuba was situated just 90 miles from U.S. shores, making it 
easier for Cuba to retaliate against the U.S. with radio operations of their own. Dumping 
propaganda on the people of Cuba was not purportedly one of Radio Marti’s aims; 
however, in reality, many have argued that the station quickly became a propaganda arm 
of the CANF.  Once Radio Marti began broadcasts, Fidel Castro almost immediately 
began jamming the radio waves and blocking those broadcasts.  As a result of this 
jamming, only a very small percentage of the Cuban population was ever able to hear 
Radio Marti.  Despite these setbacks U.S. taxpayers continued to pay millions each year 
for a project that still exists today, even though the Cold War has been over for years.  In 
1990, a similar project, TV Marti was created; this met with even less success than the 
radio station.  Radio Marti presents a very interesting case of the relationship between the 
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executive branch and the CANF.  Reagan originally envisioned this project, but from the 
very beginning, Mas was heavily involved.  Mas and the CANF were deeply involved in 
the programming and content of the radio station, while it remained a government funded 
project.  This relationship still exists. The Bush administration continues to support Radio 
Marti.  The executive branch of the U.S. fulfills dual roles through Radio Marti; it 
supports the CANF while simultaneously broadcasting its own foreign policy initiatives.  
This failure of a project financed by U.S. taxpayers continues with little opposition from 
Congress Members afraid to confront the powerful CANF.  
Radio Marti was not the first such project that the U.S. government had tried.  In 
addition to multiple similar projects in Europe, the CIA had undertaken a radio 
broadcasting initiative to Cuba in the 1960s.  This operation was called Radio Swan, and 
Mas was involved in this as well.  “As a commentator on CIA’s Radio Swan, one of E. 
Howard Hunt’s projects, he [Mas] broadcast propaganda to Cuba, a profession he still 
pursues” (Franklin, 2).  Radio Swan, “broadcast extremely partisan views, information 
and material designed for short-term psychological effect” (Final Report of The 
Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, 4).  Despite its connections with the 
CANF, Radio Marti was designed to provide less partisan coverage than Radio Swan and 
to be an operation undertaken in the open with Congressional approval. 
From the beginning this project was under direct control of the executive branch, 
with the CANF heavily involved.  Reagan began his initiative for Radio Marti in 1982 by 
appointing a commission of ten members, including several prominent businessmen from 
Miami, to investigate possibilities for this project.  The executive committee of this group 
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was composed of the chairman Clifton, White, Senator Richard B. Stone, and Jorge Mas 
Canosa.  According to this commission, “Radio Marti would fill an important 
informational void created by more than twenty years of censorship and control of the 
Cuban media by the Castro government” (Final Report of The Presidential Commission 
on Broadcasting to Cuba, 3).  According to the report of the Presidential Commission, the 
goals of this station included providing information and other news about Cuba and its 
place in the world “that was not tainted by state control.”  However, “Radio Marti 
espouses no single specific political, economic, or religious point of view.  It should have 
no relationship to any political party or exile organization” (Final Report of The 
Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, 22).  Despite these original stated 
intentions, almost from the beginning, the CANF was intimately intertwined in the 
organization and programming of Radio Marti.  Carla Anne Robbins writes, “Critics 
charge, however, that the radio has become a propaganda arm for the Foundation—at a 
cost of $15 million a year to the American taxpayer” (Robbins, 165).  She also adds, 
“Supporters claim that the station’s in depth coverage of the Foundation is proportionate 
to the group’s power and influence in the exile community” (Robbins, 165).  In other 
words, the Foundation reflects the CANF’shuge influence in South Florida by devoting 
extraordinary amounts of time to coverage of its own activities.  All this remains under 
government support and the huge bill is footed by the U.S. taxpayers. 
In the Report of the Presidential Commission, Mas is quoted urging Congress to 
set a date quickly for broadcasts to begin.  At the Commissions fifth meeting, “Another 
motion was approved at the request of Mr. Mas, recommending that the target date for 
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beginning Radio Marti should be January 28, 1983 in commemoration of the birthday of 
Jose Marti” (Final Report of The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, 
130).  Mas again flexed his muscles again by firing the director of Radio Marti after a 
disagreement.  “Ernesto Betancourt is a prominent example.  Appointed the first director 
of Radio Marti and militantly anti-Casto, he turned out not to favor tightening the trade 
embargo… Fundamentally, he objected to use of Radio Marti as the voice of Mas.  
Betancourt was ‘reassigned’ and then resigned in 1990” (Franklin, 3).  These examples 
make it clear that throughout this government sponsored project, Mas and the CANF 
were highly influential. 
The original discussion of the formation of Radio Marti included questions of 
logistics and expenditure.  It was decided that because of various technological 
difficulties, radio waves, and in particular AM radio waves, would be the most feasible 
method for transmission of the broadcasts.  “The FCC formally identified 1040 kHz as 
the recommended frequency for Radio Marti in a letter dated October 19, 1981.  The 
NTIA formally assigned it for used by the U.S. Government in January 1982” (Final 
Report of The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, 11).  Despite the fact 
that a station called Voice of America (VOA), capable of broadcasting to Cuba, already 
existed in South Florida, the green light was given to spend millions of dollars to create 
another station.  VOA had been previously used in the 1960s and 70s to broadcast a daily 
show to Cuba, so its effectiveness was clear.  (Final Report of The Presidential 
Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, 4).  Even so, “To launch Radio Marti a budget of 
$10 million in FY 82 and $7.7 million in FY 83 has been submitted to Congress by the 
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Department of State” (Final Report of The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to 
Cuba, 20).   
When originally discussing the appropriate radio frequencies, the possibility of 
television broadcasts were also discussed.  It was decided that television broadcasts were 
impractical because such a small percentage of the Cuban population had access.  Ten 
years later the prospect was revisited and TV Marti was born.  However, the Commission 
would have been better off following their original advice because TV Marti never met 
with much success.  While it can be argued that Radio Marti reached at least some 
proportion of the Cuban population, TV Marti was an utter failure.  In a 2003 
congressional overview of Radio and Television Marti, a critical member of the 
committee stated “On TV Marti we have been doing it for about 12 years now.  We have 
spent at last count I think about $160 million on TV Marti, and there is little evidence that 
all but a very few handful of Cubans have ever watched a minute of it” (Hearing Before 
the Subcommittee on The Western Hemisphere, 16).  However, he did not heavily pursue 
his criticism, and later on in the hearing it was agreed that TV Marti would continue to be 
funded. So this failure of a project continues today. 
Although Radio Marti was vastly more successful than its TV counterpart, it too 
underwent its fair share of difficulties.  One such problem was interference.  Even before 
Radio Marti began broadcasting, AM stations in the U.S. were experiencing a large 
degree of interference from Cuba.  When Castro gained power he soon took the Cuban 
government out of the international system which assigned frequencies.  He began to 
broadcast at whatever frequency he chose, creating problems for U.S. stations.  Radio 
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Stations within the U.S. came to testify before the Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, 
worried that if the U.S. were to start broadcasting to Cuba, interference would worsen.  
“The present and projected disruption of service is devastating to both public and radio 
broadcasters” (Final Report of The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, 
66).  In addition to interference another major issue was jamming.  The U.S. government 
had experienced jamming in Eastern Europe as governments of the countries they were 
broadcasting to tried to prevent U.S. government signals from reaching the desired 
audience.  Jamming was not extremely difficult and was perceived as a likely strategy to 
be employed by the Cubans at the outset of Radio Marti.  Studies have shown that due to 
jamming and content related issues, Radio Marti actually reaches is only 5% of the 
Cuban population. (Hearing Before the Subcommittee on The Western Hemisphere, 15).  
Finally, Radio Marti is designed to combat Castro and his human rights violations, yet in 
some cases it breeds further violence and human rights violations.  “As you know, 
Martha Beatriz Roque was sentenced, along with many other dissidents.  One of the 
charges against her was that she had done interviews for the Martis” (Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on The Western Hemisphere, 20).  One has to question the efficiency of 
these programs if they are causing Cuban people to undergo jail time and other forms of 
punishment. 
 One might assume that Radio Marti was a project of Reagan’s that ended when he 
left office; however this is not the case.  The station still exists and George W. Bush has 
even intensified the efforts of the Marti’s despite the end of the Cold War and the 
associated anti-communist rhetoric.  Bush has pushed for innovative ways to make the 
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stations more effective.  One of these innovations involved using government planes to 
help broadcast his speeches.  “On May 20, Cuban Independence Day, the Bush 
Administration finally broadcast over the Florida straits to Cuba, via an EC-130, a direct 
broadcast” (Hearing Before the Subcommittee on The Western Hemisphere, 3).  
Although this was somewhat effective many were concerned about the use of taxpayer’s 
money and safety of using these planes so close to Cuban airspace.  In addition to new 
and controversial technological methods, Radio Marti also began introducing new 
content to try to woo more listeners including broadcasting major league baseball games.  
A spokesperson for the station said, “We are now in the process of formulating a 
modernized programming schedule to serve what we could call our core listeners, who 
are best described as mature, 35 years of age and above” (Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on The Western Hemisphere, 11).  Yet if the station is geared towards an 
older population, one would have to question its effectiveness in inspiring those capable 
of overthrowing Castro and leading a new government into the future.  Overall, the 
Martis have produced a mixed record of failures and successes; yet, they remain one of 
the clearest cut examples of a collaboration between various Presidents and the CANF. 
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Chapter VI 
Clinton’s Election, the Torricelli Bill and the 1994 Refugee Crisis 
 
 The end of the Cold War brought the Cuban American National Foundation 
(CANF) a changing political climate, one which they were able to adapt and use for their 
own benefit.  The end of the Cold War marked the end of an era for the United States in 
terms of their foreign policy.  Clinton, a Democratic, entered the White House after 
twelve years of Republican rule.  A new emphasis was placed on domestic concerns 
rather than foreign policy, and as a result the balance of power shifted slightly from vast 
executive control to a mixture of executive and legislative control.  (Vanderbush and 
Haney, 387).  Within this new balance of power the CANF found it necessary to switch 
some of their focus from lobbying the executive branch to lobbying Congress.  They 
were fairly successful managing to lobby Congress while manipulating executive 
electoral politics to their own advantage (Vanderbush and Haney, 393-94).  Additionally, 
with the end of the Cold War, a shift occurred from a focus on defeating communism as a 
world force to at least nominally promoting democracy and human rights.  This shift 
influenced some within the Clinton administration to advocate taking a new approach and 
a softer line in regards to the Cuban situation.  Since CANF members continued to favor 
a tough policy, this new opposition posed a new threat regarding matters related to Cuba.  
The CANF responded with an emphasis on democracy and an increased connection to the 
National Endowment for Democracy, as mentioned previously.  Anti-immigration forces 
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within the United States also posed a new challenge to Cuban Americans who liked the 
favored treatment their family members and friends had been receiving when they 
immigrated.  Despite the end of the Cold War and the end of the crusade against 
communism, the CANF was able to effectively move into the 1990s and use electoral 
politics and legislative lobbying mostly to their advantage in the case of the Torricelli Bill 
and the raft crisis in 1994. 
 The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) was first introduced during the Bush 
administration in 1991 by Connie Mack, a Republican congresswoman from Florida.  
This bill “prohibit[ed] subsidiaries of U.S. firms from trading with Cuba” (Vanderbush 
and Haney, 392), effectively furthering the strain on Cuba’s already weakened post Cold 
War economy.  The Bush administration ultimately opposed this bill for a number of 
reasons, saying that it would create a problem with foreign allies and business. “Among 
the most important [objections to the bill] to the administration…was that the bill would 
cause the U.S. diplomatic costs and impinge ‘on the President’s constitutionally 
mandated powers to conduct foreign affairs’” (Vanderbush and Haney, 394).  The 
premise of the bill was questionable at best under international law, and U.S. allies were 
angry that subsidiaries of U.S. firms would not be able to trade with Cuba.  As a result, 
this bill was easily defeated when it was set forth in 1991. 
 When democratic candidate Clinton voiced his support for the CDA, Bush was 
forced to cut his losses and support the CDA to prevent the democrats from gaining 
further ground in Florida.  This time Congressman Robert Torricelli and Senator Bob 
Graham introduced the CDA.  It would again stop subsidiaries of U.S. firms from trading 
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with Cuba, and it would also make communication and family visits to Cuba easier.  
According to Vanderbush and Haney, “CANF played a prominent role throughout the 
legislative process of this bill.  Torricelli had developed close ties to the interest group” 
(393).  After developing this relationship with the CANF, “Torricelli had been the largest 
congressional recipient of campaign funds from conservative Cuban Americans-- 
$120,650” up to that point in time (Leogrande, “From Havana to Miami: U.S. Policy as a 
Two-Level Game”, 75).  CANF members supported the CDA or “Torricelli Bill,” as it 
came to be called, because it proposed harsh economic terms on Cuba while allowing 
communication with family who may still be on the island.  From the CANF point of 
view, this act was just what they wanted.  In order to promote this bill, the CANF began 
lobbying the legislative branch.  Despite the new support for this bill the Bush 
administration remained weary; it was only due to electoral politics that this bill was 
finally able to pass with Bush’s support. 
 With the 1992 presidential election soon approaching, Mas Canosa approached 
the Democrats and “offered to provide help for Clinton’s presidential campaign if he 
decided to endorse the CDA” (Vanderbush and Haney, 394).  Clinton took him up on this 
and voiced his support.  “With a campaign short of funds, an interest in being competitive 
in Florida against President Bush in the general election, and even a Rodham family 
connection to the Cuban-American community in Florida, candidate Clinton signed on in 
Miami” (Vanderbush and Haney, 394).  Clinton is by far the largest Democratic recipient 
of Cuban American campaign contributions, receiving $69,00 for his two presidential 
campaigns.  Bush in comparison received $165,225 (Opensecrets.org). After Clinton’s 
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statement of support, Bush reluctantly agreed to work with congress members to create a 
CDA that he would agree to sign.  “CANF had been able to use its money and votes to 
influence a sitting president to support a policy toward Cuba that he had previously 
argued was unnecessary, if not harmful to U.S. interests, and constitutionally 
problematic” (Vanderbush and Haney, 395).  This could only take place within the new 
context of a post Cold War world, in which the importance of foreign policy had shifted. 
 Following the end of the Cold War the U.S. stance and the stance of the CANF 
began to change.  “With Cuba…U.S. security concerns were nil and potential economic 
interests modest, so it was no surprise that the promotion of democracy became a key 
element in the revised agenda of U.S. demands.  This shift was reinforced by the growing 
political power of conservative Cuban Americans” (Leogrande, “From Havana to Miami: 
U.S. Policy as a Two-Level Game”, 73).  Castro Marino notes that the CANF thought 
that this new situation was ideal for trying to undermine the Cuban Revolution (47).  The 
CANF was able to shift its focus towards the legislative branch, and in the circumstance 
of the CDA, use electoral politics to its advantage. 
 For the most part, the goals of the CANF were in line with the goals of members 
of the Clinton administration and Congress as far as promoting democracy in Cuba; 
however, some new groups with an interest in Cuba emerged, taking a softer stance 
towards Cuba.  “These included nongovernmental organizations and private voluntary 
organizations with an interest in sending humanitarian aid to the island, think tanks, 
business groups, environmental organizations, and public health groups…they all advised 
improvement of economic and diplomatic relations” (Castro Marino, 48).  These new 
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groups introduced a new source of competition for the CANF in terms of providing 
domestic opposition to the CANF.  The CANF continued to be fairly successful despite 
these threats, increasing its lobbying and continuing to interact directly with the 
president. 
 Another issue that threatened the CANF’s all encompassing control of policy 
towards Cuba was the growing anti-immigration sentiment in the U.S. during the early 
1990s.  There were now other domestic groups besides just the CANF that had a stake in 
U.S. policy towards Cuba.  “Clinton faced new pressures from domestic constituencies in 
this crisis with regard to the immigration issue, state level elections, and even budget 
considerations about the mounting expense at Guantanamo” (Vanderbush and Haney, 
400).  The anti-immigration issue was especially prevalent in Florida, where the vast 
majority of Cuban Americans lived.  “The influx of refugees from Cuba, Haiti, and 
elsewhere had severely strained Florida’s social services and provoked an anti-
immigration backlash among the electorate” (Leogrande, “From Havana to Miami: U.S. 
Policy as a Two-Level Game”, 76).  This anti-immigration backlash played a part in the 
resolution of the refugee raft crisis of 1994.  The CANF was not able to maintain the 
influence that it once had. 
 In 1994 Cubans started leaving the island en masse; the situation was reminiscent 
of the Mariel boatlift of 1980.  When these immigrants arrived in the U.S. they were 
given asylum just as Cuban immigrants had been since the 1960s.  The recent strict 
enforcement of immigration policy towards Haitians only served to intensify the problem.  
And then, “Fidel Castro announced that henceforth Cubans were free to leave the island, 
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and thousands of balseros (rafters) proceeded to leave on whatever small rafts they could 
construct” (Vanderbush and Haney 397).  In the wake of anti-immigration sentiment, 
Clinton was faced with a difficult decision as to what to do about this new development.  
Clinton’s foreign policy advisors met and on August 18th, Janet Reno announced that 
Cuban immigrants would no longer automatically be granted asylum.  “The 1966 Cuban 
Adjustment Act had been effectively repealed, and Cuban migrants would no longer 
automatically receive political refugee status.  While the process might not seem 
synoptic, it does show the president acting during a crisis with substantial prerogative like 
we might expect” (Vanderbush and Haney, 398). The migrants would be detained at 
Guantanamo until Clinton could figure out exactly what to do with them.  CANF 
members were not pleased with this new policy and heavily lobbied Clinton to change his 
mind.  In order to appease the CANF, “Clinton announced a series of new sanctions that 
limited cash remittances and visits to the island, and authorized an increase in 
broadcasting to the island by TV and Radio Marti” (Vanderbush and Haney, 399).  
Finally the decision was made to return all illegal Cuban immigrants at Guantanamo or 
en route to the United States back to Cuba and to limit the number of visas granted to 
Cubans to 20,000 per year.  The raft crisis brought both wins and losses for the CANF in 
terms of its goals; however it definitely represented a changed situation for the amount of 
influence the CANF had with regards to issues in which Cuba was involved.  In this 
situation the CANF found its role and authority greatly reduced.  Other groups had an 
influence on Clinton’s decision and the solution to the problem was ultimately reached in 
 40 
secret talks in which the CANF was not consulted.  Despite these apparent losses, Clinton 
did feel compelled to give the CANF certain concessions. 
 During the early years of the Clinton administration the CANF had to adapt to the 
changing post Cold War U.S. political climate.  They were fairly successful, but now 
there were other groups competing with them for the president’s influence with regards to 
Cuba.  For the first time in years, the president made a decision about Cuba in which the 
CANF had no role and ultimately disagreed.  As Cuba became less of a foreign policy 
issue and slipped beyond total executive control, the CANF also had to begin increasing 
their influence on Congress.  The CANF shifted emphasis to use the Clinton 
administration’s new emphasis on promoting democracy for their own desires.  This 
pattern would more or less continue for the rest of Clinton’s presidency. 
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Chapter VII: The Helms-Burton Law 
 
 
 As Clinton’s presidency wore on in the mid 1990s, the CANF faced a record of 
both wins and losses.  They no longer had the muscle that they had during the Reagan 
years.  They had won their fight for a stricter embargo with the Torricelli Bill, but lost in 
terms of the stricter policy towards Cuban immigrants.  Rather than consulting the CANF 
leaders, Clinton conducted a deal in secret with Cuban leaders agreeing to return 
detainees caught at sea and curb the number of annual visas granted.  This took place 
within the context of growing anti-immigration sentiment nation-wide.  Problems with 
other immigrant groups led to an increasing push to reform immigration policy.  
Additionally other groups, especially Haitian immigrants and the Black caucus, were 
starting to complain about the differences between policy towards the Haitians and policy 
towards the Cubans.  Despite all this Clinton continued to back the policy set forth by the 
previous Torricelli Bill; while others in Congress pushed for harsher measures towards 
Cuba, Clinton stood strong.  Then everything changed after Cuba shot down two planes 
of the Cuban exile group Brothers to the Rescue.  A new element had been added to the 
situation that the Clinton administration could not ignore.  Under these conditions, the 
Helms-Burton law, which included drastic measures towards Cuba, passed.  The Helms-
Burton law had three objectives: “(1) to tighten the economic siege and hamper the 
process of economic transformation in Cuba; (2) to render improved relations between 
Cuba and the United States impossible;…(3) and to bring Cuba back to the status it had 
early in the twentieth century, when the United States dictated the destiny of the Cuban 
nation” (Marino, 62).  Although the CANF was involved in massive lobbying efforts 
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towards the passage of this law, they were not directly involved in changing Clinton’s 
mind.  They got what they wanted eventually, but it was due to external factors, not 
CANF direct influence on the president.  The role of the CANF had shifted from direct 
involvement with the congress and president to more of a backseat lobbying effort in 
which they seemed to have less influence. 
 The push for the Helms-Burton law began in 1994 and continued as the climate of 
anti-immigration sentiment intensified through 1995 and 1996.  Mitchell describes the 
various situations that occurred between the U.S. and Cuba in the 90s as, “Underlying 
these instances of political tensions is a strong, and only partially met, demand for 
migration to the United States from parts of Latin America and the Caribbean on the one 
hand, and a growing anxiety in the U.S. to ‘control the nation’s borders.’” (Mitchell, 93).  
He writes that an incomprehensible immigration policy resulted in situations that could 
not be managed and inevitably turned into “diplomatic emergencies.”  One such of these 
circumstances was the Cuban refugee raft crisis in 1994.  The policies set up to govern 
Cuban immigration were completely inadequate to cover such an issue, and the situation 
soon devolved into an emergency.  Rather than relying on set policies, Clinton had to rely 
on secret meetings.  A similar situation would occur in 1996 when the Brothers to the 
Rescue plane was shot down.  Mitchell wrote in his article in 1994, “Growing 
restrictionism is a nation-wide phenomenon” (Mitchell, 100).   By 1996 the national 
phenomenon had only gained more intensity.  “The impetus for a new legislative 
initiative began to emerge even before the 1994 elections that would lead to Republican 
majorities in the House and Senate.  Many on the Hill were frustrated that Castro had 
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survived the wave of democratization that had swept Latin America” (Vanderbush and 
Haney, 400).  The plane incident gave them the final excuse they needed to push the bill 
through. 
 After Clinton snubbed the CANF in his secret deal regarding the raft crisis, the 
Cuban American community decided to take action.  “Right wing sectors of the U.S.-
based Cuban community founded a coalition known as the Committee of United Cuban 
Exiles, that included, among others, …the CANF.” (Marino, 54).  This Committee saw 
immigration policy moving in another direction regarding Cuba and decided to take 
matters into its own hands.  “The Committee, together with Brothers to the Rescue and 
the Democracy Movement, sponsored flotillas that sailed around and flew over the island 
in a dangerously provocative and flagrant violation of Cuban borders” (Marino, 54).  In 
addition they angered the Castro government by scattering anti-Castro leaflets over 
Havana.  When the Republicans gained control of Congress in 1994, the CANF and the 
Cuban community saw their chance to get a foot in the door with policy making.  “With 
the legislative elections in November, 1994, the Republicans had achieved a majority in 
Congress with a highly ideological and conservative agenda…This made it possible for 
the right, and particularly the CANF to move a number of anti-Cuban proposals through 
the legislature” (Marino, 55).   However, even with the conservative congress the CANF 
did not have the power that they once had with the executive branch.  “Absent from the 
drafting process [of the Helms-Burton law] was the CANF, which by the mid 1990s was 
behaving as a typical PAC that gave money primarily to incumbent Democrats and thus 
deserved no special place in the drafting process” (Vanderbush and Haney, 401).  
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Although the CANF was not involved in the actual drafting, they still gave money to 
various congress members and now had a new voice in the House.  “On the House side, 
not only had the view of the CANF changed since the 1980s but so too had the 
demographics of the House itself, now including three Cuban-Americans.  These 
members took on many of the roles that CANF had previously played” (Vanderbush and 
Haney, 401).  It was partially through this a combination of CANF lobbying and support 
from Cuban House members that the Helms-Burton law was able to come about. 
In the mean time, Clinton was acting independently of Congress with regards to 
Cuba.  In theory, “The Clinton administration…had tried to cut a deal with the sponsors 
of the Helms-Burton Act by agreeing in principle with the purpose of the draft” (Marino, 
55).  In reality Clinton was following his own path.  In 1995, he issued an executive order 
which permitted shipments from NGOs to go to Cuba, and loosened travel and business 
restrictions towards the island.  As Clinton continued to act without consulting the 
CANF, they concentrated their efforts on Congress.  This did not make either the CANF 
or Brothers to the Rescue happy, and both parties continued to step up their efforts 
against the Clinton administration.  Clinton was concerned that the Helms-Burton Act 
violated principles of international law.  “It violated principles basic to international law 
such as the self-determination of nations, sovereign equality among states, the 
illegitimacy of the use of or threat of force (including economic coercion), and non-
interference in the internal state of affairs” (Marino, 62).  The parts of the bill he was 
referring to were Titles III and IV.  “Title III that would give U.S. citizens the right to sue  
in U.S. courts foreign companies that ‘traffic’ in stolen property in Cuba” (Vanderbush 
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and Haney, 402).  Title IV, “would deny visas to executives of companies ‘trafficking’ in 
confiscated properties in Cuba” (Vanderbush and Haney, 403).  Not only was Clinton 
worried that this would violate international law, he was also worried about spoiling 
relations with U.S. allies.   
This changed with the shoot down of the Brothers to the Rescue plane.  “On 
February 24, 1996, Cuban MiG planes shot down two small civilian aircraft in 
international waters over the Straits of Florida, killing four of their crew members” 
(Leogrande, “From Havana to Miami: U.S. Policy as a Two-Level Game”, 80).  This was 
not an unprovoked event.   Although they were not violating Cuban space at this specific 
point in time, Brothers to the Rescue had been violating Cuban airspace and dropping 
pamphlets for some time.  Castro’s government had been in contact with both the U.S. 
government and U.S. businessmen and threatened retaliation if these flights did not cease. 
Castro had been given every assurance that the flights would stop.  Nevertheless, with 
this attack, Clinton had no choice but to react and change his stance towards the Helms-
Burton Law.  “He declared his intention to work with Congress to pass the then-pending 
Helms-Burton bill, ordered an expansion of Radio Marti, and prohibited direct charter 
flights between Cuba and the United States” (Marino, 60).  A few weeks later, Clinton 
signed the Helms-Burton Act into law.  U.S. allies opposed the Helms-Burton Act and it 
was even arguably illegal under international law; yet it passed. Once again, electoral 
politics came into play.  “The Helms-Burton Act, like the Torricelli Act, was passed in an 
election year.  Both events were influenced by a fear that the president would be accused 
of weakness toward ‘Castro’s Cuba’” (Marino, 61).  This demonstrated a general trend in 
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which the president could no longer do whatever he pleased without being subject to 
criticism by his voter bases.  It was no longer a cold war climate where security concerns 
dominated everything else.  The all encompassing power of the CANF too seemed to be 
slipping.   
 One of the most surprising things about the passage of the Helms-Burton law is 
that Clinton voluntarily relinquished some of his presidential authority.  Very rarely does 
the president give one of his authorities to Congress.  In this case, Clinton stripped 
himself of the ability to control the embargo and gave full authority to the legislative 
branch, barring Castro’s death or the fall of his regime.  By codifying the embargo into 
law, Clinton was no longer able to lift it.  Vanderbush and Haney note, “entrepreneurial 
members of Congress usurped many of the functions once performed more exclusively 
by the executive and CANF” (Vanderbush and Haney, 406)1.  This seems to be the 
overwhelming lesson of the Helms-Burton Law and the Clinton era.  Power had passed 
out of the hands of the executive, and interest groups like the CANF were forced to find 
new ways to influence politics; this led to an increase in lobbying Congress and a 
decrease in attempts to win favor with the president. 
                                                 
1
 In the case of the Helms-Burton act members of congress drafted and passed the Act with little influence 
from the CANF compared to other Bills concerning Cuba. 
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Chapter VIII 
Florida’s Elections and the Cuban Influence 
 
 With all the suspense and debate regarding the state of Florida in recent 
presidential elections, one must ask what role the Cuban vote and the Cuban American 
National Foundation (CANF) had to play in all this.  The 2000 election came down to a 
tie, and the result hinged on the final decision by the state of Florida, which was riddled 
with arguments and irregularities.  Although the 2004 election was not as contested, it 
was still very close and again Florida was up for grabs as a crucial swing state.  With the 
2008 election soon approaching, Florida’s 25 electoral votes may be in play again.  
Although the past few elections in Florida have been very close, this was not always the 
case.  In the first half of the twentieth century Floridians were die hard southern 
Democrats; the state went overwhelmingly Democrat in almost every election.  With the 
Civil Rights era, the positions of the Democratic party began to change, and some Florida 
voters began to shift their opinions as well.  From almost the time of the Cuban 
Revolution, Cuban Americans voted steadfastly Republican.  Many attribute this to 
animosity Cubans had towards Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs and also to the Cubans’ 
alliance with Reagan in the 1980s.  During the 1980s, Cuban Americans represented a 
significant voting bloc for the Republicans in Florida.  This trend continued well into the 
1990s, however, in recent years patterns have begun to change.  Recently some Cubans 
and other Hispanics have begun to vote Democrat, although pressure remains from the 
CANF to vote conservatively, and the majority of Cubans remain Republicans.  This 
slight shift has been attributed to younger Cubans focusing on issues other than deposing 
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Castro.  While the exodus from Cuba remains in the minds of older Cubans, especially 
members of the CANF, younger second and third generation Cubans are beginning to 
focus more on other issues like the economy and U.S. immigration policy.  Additionally, 
older Cubans have reacted to both Republican and Democratic policies that go against 
their mission in Cuba.  Whichever political party is willing to side with the CANF wins 
CANF money and votes.  Although, the power of the conservative Cuban voting bloc has 
begun to wane and is not discussed as much in recent elections; it still remains a force to 
consider especially in elections that are as close as the recent elections in Florida. 
 In the 1980s, Cuban Americans represented an important group within the 
Republican Party in Florida.  This was the first time the Republican Party had made any 
significant inroads in the state.  This time period was also the height of power for the 
CANF during Reagan’s presidency.  The organization had influence in everything from 
the Cuban embargo to the running of Radio Marti.  They also had the power to largely 
sway the vote of the Cuban American population in Florida.  Many of the members of the 
CANF had been born in Cuba and immigrated between the 1950s and 1980s.  Their main 
political goal was to oust Castro and they saw the anti-Castro, anti-communist, 
Republican Party as their vehicle to do this.  “The influx of Cubans throughout the 1960s 
and into the 1970s …bolstered Republican aspirations” (Colburn, 106). At this point, 
Cubans were a huge asset to the party and noted for the change they made in the political 
climate in Florida.  “Cuban Americans voted heavily for President Reagan in 1980 and 
1984” (Volsky, 1).   In 1988 when George H.W. Bush ran for president, Cuban 
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Americans made up, “8 to 10 percent of the Republican vote in Florida”2 (Volsky, 1).  He 
certainly courted the Cuban population; while campaigning, he announced that if elected 
“he would appoint a Hispanic person to the Cabinet” (Volsky, 1).  Jeb Bush, a local 
politician and George H.W. Bush’s son, was a key member of his father’s campaign.  He 
is quoted as saying about the Cuban community, “in terms of money, it’s an important 
community and will be very important for my dad” (Weinraub, 1).  In 1987, Bernard 
Weintraub reported, “Mr. Bush seems especially popular among Cuban-Americans.  The 
reasons are his link to President Reagan, a hero to the Cuban community; the work of his 
Spanish speaking son Jeb, as well as the Vice President’s [Bush’s] appeals to Cuban and 
other Hispanic leaders” (Weintraub, 1).  In this election, Cubans made up a large 
proportion of the Hispanic community in Florida, and Bush won an overwhelming 84% 
of the Hispanic vote (Sack, 1).  Although Florida did not play a primary role in this 
particular election, the Cuban American vote was quite influential there and Jeb Bush 
emerged as an important political figure. 
The son of George H.W. Bush and brother of George W. Bush, Jeb Bush has been 
in Florida politics for decades and now serves as the governor of Florida.  He is also 
credited as playing a crucial role in campaigning within the Cuban community for both 
his father and his brother.  In the early 1980s Jeb Bush made inroads into the Cuban 
community in Florida by partnering with Armando Codina, an influential Cuban 
businessman in the area to form a real estate business (Colburn, 158). Jeb later used these 
connections with the Cuban community in his father and brother’s campaigning. “Jeb had 
                                                 
2
 See chart at the end of the chapter detailing Cuban Republican and Democratic voting in recent elections. 
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worked on his father’s campaign in Florida and helped him secure the votes of Blue Dog 
Democrats in the central and northern sections of the state and of Cubans in Miami-
Dade” (Colburn, 145).  When George W. Bush ran in 2000, Jeb was in an even better 
position to have an influence, as governor.  “Moreover, Republican leaders gave Jeb 
Bush credit for the party’s political rise to state leadership” (Colburn, 163).  By the end of 
the 1990s, Florida was no longer a state of traditional Democrats; the Republican party 
had gained a true foothold.   
 During Clinton’s two terms in office from 1992 to 2000, the traditional Cuban 
American Republican voting bloc began to erode.  In 1992, the Cuban Americans voted 
predictably with 72 percent of Cubans voting to re-elect President Bush (Navarro, 1).  
However, as Clinton began to woo Cuban voters with his policies and second and third 
generation Cuban immigrants came of voting age, this began to change.  During his time 
in office, Clinton enacted a number of policies with regards to Cuba, both good and bad 
by the standards of the CANF.  As a result, the Cuban American electorate shifted back 
and forth in their support of the Democratic Party depending on Clinton’s most recent 
action.  
 In 1996, Florida was a state with 14 million people and 25 electoral votes.  In the 
1990s it came into its own as a crucial swing state, “which Bill Clinton lost in 1992 by 
100,000 votes” (Navarro, 1).  With this tight margin in 1992, it was possible that the state 
could go in either direction in 1996.  Sack writes, “Hispanic voters account for about 15 
percent of Florida’s registered Republicans” (Sack, 2).  Although 15 percent does not 
seem like an extremely large amount, with a margin of only 100,000 it could make a 
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difference.  Navarro writes, “Although Cuban-Americans, about 7 percent of the state’s 
electorate, are not usually critical as a voting bloc in Florida, which Bill Clinton lost in 
1992 by 100,000 votes, a shift in their support could help the President erase the gap” 
(Navarro, 1).  Opinions about how Clinton would do with the Cuban vote in this election 
varied widely.  Navarro writes about Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Cuban American Republican 
member of the House of Representatives from Florida.  According to Navarro, Ros-
Lehtinen had stopped voting with her party recently in some circumstances because of a 
strong anti-immigration stance among Republicans.  “Her rebellion underscores the 
disenchantment of Cuban-Americans with Republicans” (Navarro, 1).  The Democrats 
also gained the support of many Cubans when Clinton voiced his support for the Helms-
Burton Act and denounced Castro for shooting down the two Brothers to the Rescue 
planes.  “By tightening sanctions against Cuba and removing his opposition to a bill 
aimed at discouraging foreign investment in Cuba, Mr. Clinton managed to steal the 
spotlight from Republican candidates” (Sack, 1).  In an interview with Francisco 
Hernandez, the president of the Cuban American National Foundation, Hernandez said, 
“He [Castro] has never been silent for very long.  And if the President stands up against 
another challenge, I would say there’s a possibility that he could carry the Cuban-
American community” (Sack, 2).  These were strong words from the leader of the CANF, 
an organization that had been staunchly Republican for years.  Whatever the views of the 
Cuban community on Clinton’s policies, polls showed that the community had begun to 
shift as a voting bloc.  “A survey in August by Dario Moreno, a political scientist at 
Florida International University in Miami, found that although Mr. Clinton gets the 
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support of barely a quarter of Cuban Americans, only 57 percent would vote for Mr. 
Dole” (Navarro, 1).  A large amount of the 72 percent that had gone to Bush in 1992 had 
deteriorated.  This change shows a reaction to Clinton’s pro-Cuban policies as well as a 
need by Cuban Americans to show favoritism to Clinton in order to have a say in his 
future policies with relation to Cuba.  Clinton won the state but lost among Cubans, but 
only by a margin of 4 percent. 
 All this shifting back and forth within the Cuban American community proved 
especially important within the context of the 2000 election.  This election ended in 
almost a dead tie in Florida, with Gore requesting a recount because of irregularities and 
mistakes in the counting of many votes.  Florida was the deciding factor in the nation for 
this election; whichever party won Florida had won the election.  Although the Cubans 
did not represent an extraordinarily large voting bloc, in an election this close, every vote 
mattered.  Cubans were angered by the Democrat’s decision to send Elian Gonzalez, a 
child who had become a political symbol, back to Cuba.  Additionally, in 1999 Tim 
Golden wrote, “The Clinton administration is quietly moving to expand contacts between 
the United States and Cuba” (Golden, 1).  This is the last thing most Cuban Americans 
wanted.  As a result, “four out of five Cuban-Americans backed Bush in south Florida, 
helping tip an election where the difference turned on a few hundred votes” (Sesin and 
Federico-O’Murchu, 1).  After a series of judicial and legislative inputs, Gore conceded 
the election and George W. Bush became the next President. 
 In 2004, another close race in Florida ensued.  Yet again Cubans were split over 
who to vote for.  Some Cubans were angered by the restrictions on visits to Cuba that 
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Bush enacted in his first term (Sesin and Federico-O’Murchu, 2).  John Kerry, the 
Democratic contender, said in his platform that he would role back these restrictions.  
However, the Bush administration also enacted positive reforms from the point of view of 
most Cubans.  “Other elements of the package included increased funding to support 
democratic activists in Cuba and for Radio Marti, the U.S. backed radio station” (Sesin 
and Federico-O’Murchu, 3).  A survey of Cubans in Miami revealed that the length of 
time they had been in the U.S. directly correlated with how they planned to vote.  “Those 
born in Cuban and who came to the United States before 1980…favored Bush by 89 
percent (Sesin and Federico-O’Murchu, 2).  These voters had been in the country for a 
long time and traditionally favored the Republican Party.  “The second group, 15 percent 
[of registered Cuban voters], fled the island since 1980, and has closer ties to Cuba.  They 
have more relatives on the island, and are therefore more affected by the new restrictions.  
The majority favored Kerry by 40 percent, with 29 percent backing Bush, and 31 percent 
undecided” (Sesin and Federico-O’Murchu, 2).  As those who immigrated before 1980 
get older, those who have immigrated more recently will have more of an influence.  
Finally, “The third group made up 10 percent of the registered voters, and these were 
American-born children of Cubans.  They do not have direct ties to Cuba and favored 
Kerry by 58 percent, against 38 percent for Bush, 10 percent undecided” (Sesin and 
Federico-O’Murchu, 2).  Despite these changes, Bush ended up winning Florida in 2004. 
 With all of the hype surrounding these recent elections, the Cuban vote in Florida 
remains highly sought after for the upcoming 2008 presidential election.  It is likely that 
Florida will remain a swing state and the vote in this state will again be close.  Laura 
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Wides-Munoz writes of the campaigning politicians’ recent visits to Miami, “Such visits 
are a quasi-requirement because South Florida’s Cuban-Americans have turned out 
heavily for Republicans, particularly in presidential races, and nearly 770,000 of the 
state’s more than 1 million Cuban Americans live in Miami Dade County” (Wides-
Munoz, 1).  Additionally, “A survey in June on behalf of the New Democratic Network  
by Bendixen and Associates, an independent polling firm based in Miami, found that 75 
percent of the 437,332 Miami-Dade registered voters are Cuban-Americans” (Sesin and 
Frederico-O’Murchu, 2).  In trying to determine Cuban influence in future elections it is 
useful to look at past trends among Cuban voters.  Cubans certainly seemed to have their 
strongest influence in the 1980s when they voted as a coherent bloc for the Republican 
Party.  Since then things have begun to shift as younger Cubans with different priorities 
have come of voting age.  Additionally Cuban voters have reacted both favorably and 
negatively to various policies by the Clinton and Bush administrations; this has led to 
further deviations in their voting patterns.  The Cuban American community continues to 
want a politician in power who can promote their goals; however, they have now started 
to differ in their opinions of the way in which to do this. Older Cubans still want a 
Republican who is strict towards Castro in power.  Newer generations have started to side 
with the Democratic Party and its more lenient policies towards immigration. 
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*Results from 1980 to 1996 are taken from Dario Moreno’s data from predominantly 
Hispanic districts in Miami-Dade County.  Moreno argues that this is a fairly accurate 
representation of the Cuban vote because Cubans make up the majority of Hispanics in 
these precincts and because Cubans are significantly more likely to participate in politics 
than other Hispanic immigrant groups. 
**Results from 2000 are taken from a New York Times article and are representative of 
South Florida.  I was not able to find the exact number of Cubans that voted for Gore, but 
compared to voters statewide Cubans voted overwhelmingly for Bush. 
***In a 2006 survey of Miami-Dade and Broward Counties this represents the percentage 
of Cubans registered as Republicans and Democrats not actual votes cast. 
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Chapter IX 
The Present: Elian and Issues During George W. Bush’s Presidency 
 
With each new presidency the Cuban lobbying effort must adapt and change.  I 
have investigated Cuban American populations during past presidencies, and I will now 
turn to the policies of our current president and describe how Cuban Americans as a 
group are currently faring.  With the 1997 death of Jorge Mas Canosa, who had been the 
leader of the CANF for over two decades, many were wondering how the lobbying group 
would hold up.  For the next few years the CANF went through a period of less 
coherence than before, and it seemed that some Cubans, especially younger Cubans, were 
starting to part ways with the once all powerful group.  This changed with the 
controversy over six year old Elian Gonzalez, a Cuban boy who was rescued at sea on 
Thanksgiving Day 1999 and brought to his relatives in Miami.  The custody battle that 
ensued between the boy’s relatives and his father in Cuba gave Cuban Americans in 
Miami a cause to rally around.  This issue has helped to revitalize the CANF.  
Additionally, Bush’s policies have been just what the exile group wants, strengthening 
restrictions on Cuba.  However, despite these promising developments, opposition to the 
CANF is also growing both among Cubans and among outsiders.  With Castro’s decline 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other groups are becoming more and more 
vocal about ending the embargo and increasing contact with Cubans.  While in the past 
the CANF had mainly the president and congress to contend with, it seems that in the 
future the American public and many Cubans will challenge the group. 
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 With the many thousands of immigrants that come to the U.S. every year no one 
could have foreseen the controversy that would embroil the whole nation with the arrival 
of 6 year old Elian Gonzalez.  Most immigrants enter the country as just another statistic, 
but this one captured the attention of the media, the Cuban community, the American 
public, and even presidential candidates George W. Bush and Al Gore.  Elian was 
rescued at sea on Thanksgiving Day 1999, after the raft carrying his mother and several 
others capsized. His mother died in the accident.  Once in Miami a custody battle began 
with the boy’s relatives arguing that they could provide him with a better life than his 
father in Cuba, therefore they should have the right to custody.  According to Sarah 
Benet-Weiser, the relatives argued, “the ‘Democratic American family’ is one in which 
the little boy will be raised properly…This family was then juxtaposed against the 
equally caricatured ‘Communist Cuban family” (Banet-Weiser, 6).  Banet-Weiser writes 
that Elian’s use as a political pawn is the reason the family even had a case to be heard in 
courts, rather than just having him immediately returned to his father as custody laws 
would entail.  She writes, “it was Elian’s potential as a political subject, what he 
represented metaphorically in terms of dominant ideologies about citizenship and 
immigration in the U.S., and his position in a particular immigrant community, the 
Cuban exile community in Miami, that so captured an American media audience” (Benet-
Weiser, 7).  In any event, while Elian’s case was being heard in court, bills were 
introduced both in the House and the Senate to give this boy permanent residency status. 
 While all this was going on, Gore and Bush who were both campaigning for the 
upcoming 2000 presidential election felt the need to voice their opinions in order to gain 
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the support of the Cuban community.  David Rieff writes, “For decades, it has been a 
truism that anyone aspiring to national office will cater to the most extreme and fanatical 
elements in the Cuban exile community rather than stand on principle.  Backing their 
demand that Elian be given permanent United States residency status, Mr. Gore plays 
into their attempts to delay and obstruct Elian’s return” (Rieff, 1).  At odds with many in 
the Democratic Party, Gore sided with the Cuban Americans in this hotly contested 
debate.   Rieff attributes Gore’s move as an attempt to win the vote of younger Cubans. 
He says Gore thought that attaining the Cuban vote was a distinct possibility and cites the 
1996 election in which the Republican candidate Bob Dole got many less Cuban votes 
than expected.  Gore was also at odds with the American public in his statement.  “On 
April 24, the last time Gallup asked this question, 63 percent of Americans wanted Elian 
to live with his father, while only 25 percent sided with the Miami relatives” (Mayer, 
594). 
 Despite all of the pleas that were made on Elian’s behalf, the court ended up 
ruling in favor of his father, and INS had to be sent in to physically remove him from the 
relatives’ custody.  George W. Bush capitalized on this event when he “contributed to the 
editorializing of the event and remarked that ‘the photograph of the frightened boy being 
‘removed from his home at gunpoint’ was ‘chilling’ and ‘not an image a freedom-loving 
nation wants to show the world’” (Banet-Weiser, 18).  The Cuban community had 
entered center stage with an issue in which two presidential candidates felt the need to 
become involved.  This was good publicity for their cause and helped rally the somewhat 
weakened community after the death of one of their greatest leaders Jorge Mas Canosa.  
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The Elian controversy again proved to be important when the 2000 presidential race 
came down to almost a dead tie in Florida.  Evan Thomas and Mark Hosenball write that 
the Cuban community had a part in slowing the recount of votes in Miami-Dade because 
“they never forgave the Clinton-Gore administration for the Elian grab” (Thomas and 
Hosenball, 1). 
 Besides the revitalization of the Cuban community around the Elian issue, the 
community was also able to rejoice in Bush’s policies towards the Castro regime.  In 
2003, “President Bush announced…that the government was tightening a ban on travel to 
Cuba and making it easier for more immigrants to enter the United States” (Bumiller, 1).  
Both of these actions fit in well with the goals of the CANF.  Additionally, “Mr. Bush 
also announced the creation of a commission, to be led by Secretary of State Colin L. 
Powell and Mel Martinez, the Cuban-born secretary of housing and urban development, 
to plan for what Mr. Bush said would be ‘Cuba’s transition from Stalinist rule to a free 
and open society’” (Bumiller, 1).  This Commission came to be known as the 
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.  Although Bush has clearly not turned Cuba 
into a democratic society, the mere creation of such a group suggests his solidarity and 
willingness to work with exile groups.  Wayne Smith describes the plan the Commission 
came up with: “A few more Radio Marti broadcasts, a few more travel restrictions, 
another economic sanction or two and it would all be over” (Smith, 1).  When he says ‘it 
would all be over,’ he refers to the communist regime in Cuba.  The plan also strongly 
advises that the U.S. intervene if Fidel Castro were to try to pass power to his brother 
Raul.  As Smith notes, this has already happened and nothing the U.S. has done has been 
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able to topple the regime.  As noted in previous chapters, the increase in ineffective 
Radio Marti broadcasts and embargo sanctions that have been in place for years are likely 
to make little difference.  Smith also notes, “The administration also promises to provide 
some $80 million for dissidents on the island…Virtually all such funds remain in Miami” 
(Smith, 2).  Basically the administration’s goals are very much in keeping with the goals 
of the CANF, but they have done little or nothing to actually change the situation in 
Cuba. 
 Given that after years, the CANF and government policies towards Cuba seem to 
have little effect other than wasting taxpayer’s money, there is an increasing emergence 
of groups working against these policies.  In a poll published in 2001 by Public Opinion 
Quarterly most Americans reported not feeling that Cuba was a threat after the end of the 
Cold War.  Additionally, “In two surveys conducted in 2000…about 55 percent of the 
American public favored reviving diplomatic ties with Cuba, while 33 percent opposed 
it” (Mayer, 591).  Not surprisingly, this level of opposition to current policies translated 
into action at the level of NGOs and Cuban dissidents.  One such group is an Independent 
Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.  This group argued for action 
that must be taken within our current framework to initiate change.  They focused on the 
issue of human rights abuses, which as they saw them, would not go away unless the U.S. 
took a more proactive stance.  They also argued that the Bush administration’s bans on 
travel were ridiculous, writing, “the Task Force believes that freedom is contagious and 
that people-to-people contacts with ordinary American citizens will help convey 
democratic and free-market ideas to ordinary Cubans” (U.S. Cuban Relations in the 21st 
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Century, 20).  This is a claim that many have put forth, even within the government; the 
best way to bring about democracy is to have more contact with the Cuban people.  As I 
mentioned earlier, even many Cubans, especially younger ones are beginning to disagree 
with the harsh line being promoted by the CANF.  Although they are often stifled within 
the Cuban American community, these dissidents voice their objections voting against 
the traditional political party of the Cubans, the Republicans. 
 In conclusion, although the Cuban community was able to create quite a bit of 
hype surrounding the Elian issue and win the favor of George W. Bush in most of his 
policies, a growing opposition movement is presenting a challenge to the monolithic view 
presented by the CANF.  NGOs, Cubans and some members of the government wish to 
lift the embargo and extend an olive branch to the Cuban people.  In the past, the Cuban 
Americans have been fairly successful at organizing around new issues, like the Elian 
case, and influencing various presidents; however, one must wonder how long this can go 
on with opposition to the group growing steadily. 
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Margaret Henn 
Conclusions 
 
 
 The question remains: how and why has a small immigrant population amassed 
so much power that they are able to almost single-handedly dictate policy towards Cuba?  
From the 1980s to the present the CANF has been able to convince/force presidents, both 
Democrat and Republican alike, to enact policies that are questionably in the interest of 
the United States.  Some of these policies have been racist, some have purposely 
deceived American citizens, and all have resulted in failure with regards to the goal of 
promoting democracy in Cuba.  Why have presidents, congresses, and the public allowed 
this to go on for so long without question or condemnation?  I have found several theories 
that people have used to answer this question.  Some have argued that money in the form 
of campaign donations or electoral votes caused presidents to bend over backwards for 
the CANF.  However, I have found the solution to this question to be over-determined.  
There is no one factor or set of factors that have proved important enough to definitely 
answer why the CANF has had so much sway.  I have been able to identify several 
factors that contributed to making the CANF unique and added to its success.  I have also 
determined that the CANF achieved a great amount of success in a relatively short time, 
so much so that they were able to influence presidents to make decisions that were at best 
questionable and at worst detrimental to the national interest of the United States.  
However, why the CANF still yields so much power after years of mistakes is a question 
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that must be further addressed by presidents, Congress, and the public.  This abuse of 
power must not be allowed to continue. 
While it is impossible to determine the exact causes of the rise or decline of the 
CANF, I have identified several factors that seem to be contributing factors.  The CANF 
has enjoyed success as an ethnic interest group that is arguably unrivaled by any other 
group except perhaps the Israel lobby.  This success is probably due to a number of 
factors, but one must at the very least consider the position that Cuban immigrants 
occupied in society as opposed the position that most other immigrants occupy.  In 1950s 
and 60s Cuban immigrants often came from the middle and upper classes in Cuba and 
were well prepared to gain a foothold in Miami both economically and politically.  Also, 
it certainly helped that the U.S. government thought that letting immigrants from 
communist countries into the U.S. would discredit the communist way of life.  The 
Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 made it incredibly easy for Cubans to enter and become 
American citizens.  This act remained in place well into the 1990s.  As I mentioned in my 
comparison of Cuban and Haitian immigrants, many have even gone as far as to declare 
this immigration policy racist.  By favoring Cubans over other immigrant groups the 
government has created tensions between immigrant groups and encouraged the type of 
anti-immigration hysteria that exists today.  It is unclear why Cubans were shown 
favoritism for so long in that this policy was in effect for 30 years and never resulted in a 
weakening of Castro’s government.   
In the 1980s, when Reagan was looking for a way to appear tougher towards 
unfavorable Latin American regimes, an alliance with the Cuban American exiles seemed 
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to be an opportunity to achieve this.  The Cuban Americans would support Reagan’s 
tough stance, and in turn he would support their group.  Hence, a number of 
circumstances converged to pave the way for the creation and success of the CANF.  
Through the 1990s, long after the end of the Cold War, this group remained powerful and 
successful in its mission of lobbying the U.S. government to take a tough stance towards 
Castro.  For example, they heavily lobbied for the Helms-Burton act, which prevented 
multinational corporations from doing business with Cuba and greatly angered U.S. allies 
abroad.   
In recent years, as a new generation of Cuban Americans has come of age in the 
United States there has been a slight decline in the CANF’s influence.  Without the prior 
leaders, like Jorge Mas Canosa, voices of dissent are becoming prevalent in the Cuban 
community.  The younger generation of Cuban Americans are further removed from 
Castro’s regime and many of them have never even been to Cuba.  Therefore, they align 
themselves more with other immigrant groups in the U.S. than with Cubans.  They tend 
to disagree with the harsh conservative measures of the founders of the CANF and 
support measures that would help all immigrants in the U.S. Additionally, more recent 
immigrants from Cuba are statistically not as likely to be from the upper class there, and 
are less likely to become rich and achieve positions of power in the United States.  There 
are now voices of dissent within the Cuban community about the way in which the U.S. 
should conduct relations with Cuba.  Additionally, now that Castro is no longer the leader 
of Cuba, Cuban Americans have lost the symbol of the regime that they once rallied 
against.  They no longer have one coherent goal to defeat Castro. Consequently, I expect 
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that all of these factors will lessen the powerful position that the CANF has been able to 
create for itself in society. 
Although the CANF seems to be on somewhat of a decline, the unchecked power 
that they held for years with regards to Cuban policy remains amazing.  The U.S. 
government had a long record of tense relations with Cuba, and the CANF was able to 
build upon this and lobby successfully for harsh measures that were sometimes not in the 
national interest of the U.S.  One of the primary examples I have highlighted is the 
funding of Radio and TV Marti.  Both of these programs are funded by U.S. taxpayers 
and neither of them are widely known to the U.S. population.   
Many non-Cuban U.S. citizens have consistently supported normalizing relations 
with Cuba, especially since the 1990s.  The ongoing embargo with Cuba has not ruined 
Castro’s government, and there is no real explanation as to why the embargo continues.  
There have been a plethora of arguments made that normalizing relations would increase 
trade and the spread of ideas. This would ultimately be more effective in bringing about a 
democracy and ending human rights abuses then a harsh embargo would.  Instead of 
working to normalize relations, TV and Radio Marti programs, which are run by the 
CANF and financed by the U.S. government, have served to annoy the Castro 
government and increase tensions by spreading U.S. propaganda.  Radio and TV Marti 
waste huge amounts of money and are not in keeping with what the majority of U.S. 
citizens think is best for the country. What is worse, neither of these programs has even 
been particularly effective at what it sets out to do.  Radio Marti has been blocked in a 
wide range of areas by the Castro government for years now.  It still reaches some 
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percentage of the population, but the percentage is relatively small and it is hard to 
determine whether any positive results have actually come of these broadcasts.  TV Marti 
is even less successful.  Very few Cubans have televisions, and the programs have been 
shown to reach almost no one.   
The lack of success of the Marti programs leads one to question why the 
government allows itself to pander to the wishes of the CANF, spend millions of dollars, 
and go against the interests of many U.S. citizens.  Some have argued that the answer to 
this question lies in large donations to campaigns, but I have concluded that CANF 
donations are not especially large or influential.  The amount of money that the CANF 
donates might be influential to local politicians, but it is a pittance compared to the 
overall amount that presidential candidates raise in campaign financing.  Yet, presidents 
continue to pay attention to the Cuban American population in their campaigning and are 
later held hostage to the wishes of the CANF in their policy making.  Other scholars have 
argued that presidents are beholden to the Cuban Americans because they seek their 
electoral votes in order to win Florida.  However, I have shown in my paper that although 
Cuban Americans typically vote as a block, they are too small of a population to have 
much of an effect in the election as a whole.  Electoral votes and money may play a small 
part in the power of the CANF but they do not explain the vast influence this group has 
over presidents both liberal and conservative alike. 
Another policy that I found to be particularly questionable is the funding for the 
National Endowment for Democracy.  The National Endowment for Democracy is 
funded by the government, but the money is given out to private organizations.  The 
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organizations, such as the CANF, act privately, but since their money comes from the 
government, they must take into account whether their actions are in line with 
government wishes; if they are not favored by the government, they may not qualify for 
further funding in the future.  In this way, the government can achieve some of its more 
subversive “democracy building” objectives without direct involvement.  Organizations 
like the CANF get involved on the ground in Cuba in ways that the U.S. government 
could not.  This program represents yet another example of deception of the American 
taxpayers.  And, yet again, it is questionable whether the U.S. government is acting in its 
own self interest.  By giving its money out to private groups, the government no longer 
has direct control over its policy objectives.  Groups such as the CANF can undertake 
harsher measures than the government and take part in activities that may not in fact lead 
to democracy building.  The government claims to give vast amounts of money to the 
CANF through the NED for purposes of democracy building; yet, as I mentioned before, 
the CANF’s harsh measures for democracy building in Cuba have not worked in the past, 
and they are not likely to work in the future.  This is another policy that U.S. citizens and 
Congress should be seriously questioning and reworking.  
Finally, I conclude that the failures and successes of Cuban Americans have often 
been tied to the policies and sometimes mistakes of individual presidents.  As I have 
discussed, if Eisenhower had established relations with the Castro government, it is 
unlikely that Castro would have even turned to the Soviets formed a socialist 
government.  This was the beginning of real problems for the United States when it came 
to Cuba.  Carter made small steps towards easing tensions with the Cubans, but when 
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Reagan came into office, relations worsened.  Reagan felt the need to be tough on Latin 
American governments that he did not approve of.  His administration is credited for 
providing the impetus for the CANF.  He needed the Cuban Americans to back him up, 
and they needed him to provide a venue for them to express their foreign policy desires.  
The CANF did in fact help Reagan promote his objectives towards Cuba, however, as I 
have mentioned, in later years this organization went on to increase tensions with Cuba, 
which was not necessarily a good thing for the United States.  Clinton’s erred in flip 
flopping on his policies towards Cuba.  At times he tried to act independently of the 
CANF. At other times, such as the shooting down of the Brother’s to the Rescue plane, 
he played right into the hands of the CANF.  Both Clinton and George W. Bush acted as 
if gaining the Cuban American vote was crucial to their winning their respective 
elections, yet the Cuban American vote comprises only a very small portion of Florida’s 
population.  Many of these decisions lead me to question what the various presidents 
were thinking and why they felt that they had to listen to the CANF so much.  My study 
of past presidencies indicates that the policies of individual presidents will continue to be 
influential to the successes or failures of the CANF.  Future presidents need to take a long 
hard look at their policies towards Cuba and evaluate whether they are actually in line 
with the interests of the United States.  While the reason why the CANF exerts so much 
influence remains unclear, one thing is clear: CANF policies have not been effective in 
forming a democracy in Cuba.  The time has come for the American public to seriously 
question the amount of power this organization has and take control of Cuba policy into 
its own hands. 
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